Abstract
It is a known fact that any country’s economic success largely depends on its energy sector since it is the backbone of the country and provides foundational support to several other industries in any economy. India didn’t catch up to the success during the Industrial Revolution due to several reasons, one of the major reasons for its failure to catch up or for that matter to succeed in the Industrial Revolution was the lack of its energy needs being met adequately.
However, with the development of the Indian energy sector, legal complexities also increased. Even with an array of laws before the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016, they failed to address not just the energy sector, but the insolvency, and bankruptcy issues of the companies in the Indian energy sector as well. Now, after the IBC came into the picture, the Indian energy sector to date continues to face issues with the procedure as established under IBC. The authors have first enumerated the development of the Indian energy sector, by giving the readers a picture of the pre-independence, and post-independence picture of the Indian energy sector, followed by the introduction of IBC to the country. Furthermore, the authors have then established the need for separate legislation/sections under IBC by enumerating the reasons.
History
The development of this sector primarily started with the commissioning of the130 KW hydroelectric plant in the hills of Darjeeling in 1897, which was shortly followed by a steam power plant of 1 MW at Calcutta in 1899 by CESC, known as Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation.
With the enactment of theCalcutta Electric Lighting Act in 1895 by the then Government of Bengal, the first license initially encompassed an area of 5.64 square miles (14.6 km2). This license was secured by Kilburn & Co. in the year 1897. These were the agents of the Indian Electric Company Ltd. which then changed their name to the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. in the year 1897. This very corporation was registered in London with registered capital amounting to 1000 pounds.
This was followed by a4 MW hydroelectric plant commissioned at Shivasamudram in 1902 along with a 78 VK 150 km long transmission line, the longest in the world back then. The capacity of this plant was gradually increased to 42 MW by the early 1930s.
While other notable developments during that period were by CESC in Calcutta and by Tata Power Co. in the Bombay–Poona area which led to the electrification of at least some of the developing metros during the British Rule of India, the potential of its expansion was realized much later by the Government of India, who then enforced regulatory control of the sector by enacting theIndian Electricity Act, 1910.
TheElectricity Act, of 1910 which enumerated upon the foundation fundamental mechanism for the electric dispensing industry in India, governed the Indian power sector was at least fifty years. This act encompassed the provisions for the generation of electricity for both the public and private players in the sector, coupled with the requirements to procure a license for distribution of electricity in a particular area. Furthermore, the Electricity Act of 1910 also enumerates upon the technical functions, and safety policies of electricity, coupled with a legal structure for allied aspects which includes therelationship between the licensee and the consumer.
Before Independence activities relating to power, the sector was restricted to private companies operating in urban areas only. The aggregate installed capacity at the time of independence of India in 1947 was around 1363 MW.
When glancing over the power-generation in the post-independence India, we find the private players (like that of Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation or CESC) supplying more than 75% of the total power-generation capacity in the country. It is pertinent to note that this supply was limited to the cities, or the urban areas, with the rural areas dwelling in dark, without any electricity.
Intending to rationalize its growth in post-independence India, the Government took a significant step to enact theElectricity Supply Act, 1948 (ESA) entrusting the responsibility for the development of the sector to individual states, however, which did not lead to the performance that was desired and rather the sector deteriorated. Post-independence while the energy sector, particularly the power sector has grown with an increase in the generation of power and supply, the demand, due to a burgeoning population and a growing middle class, has always outstripped the supply, thus leading to shortages and a general lack of electrification across the country. Furthermore, Electricity, or rather control over resources that lead to the creation of energy for the country is a topic on theconcurrent list, which means that it’s dealt with by both the central and state governments. In the initial decades, post-independence, the power sector was predominantly monopolized by the governments, both central and state. However, before we understand how the IBC plays out in the power sector, it is important to first get a glimpse into the history of the development of the power sector.
SEB’s, Grids and the Story of Losses
This led to the creation of state electricity boards (SEBs) in the 1950s and thus started the era of planned development nationally with the formulation of the First Five Year Plan in 1951. The performances of private companies notablyCESC and Tata Electric Co. in the Calcutta and Bombay areas were taken into consideration and were thus not nationalized.
SEBs (State Electricity Boards) were expected to develop networks of transmission lines which till then had been largely underdeveloped so that they could be added to generation capacity and that electrification could be extended, which was till then limited only to the cities, across the country.
The Act under its purview brought in state participation for power generation, transmission, and distribution facilities, thereby limiting theESA, 1910.
However, SEBs failed and by the early ’70s started incurring severe losses because of factors such as political interference and mismanagement along with other reasons. The reason for the SEBs engulfing in crisis has been zeroed down to the politics which circumnavigated around the agricultural subsidies. This was not a one-way thing, rather it was a chain reaction. The story started with the Green Revolution, which required improved irrigational facilities for agricultural boom. Electricity played a crucial factor here as it was required to run the pumps for groundwater on farms. Now, apart from irrigation aiding in food security to the country, they did play an important role in formulation of vote banks amongst these farmers. This tussle of politics, and green revolution gave a huge setback to the energy sector,which resulted in institutional lock-in within the sector.
While procuring the vote bank within the farmers, the aspect of ‘electricity subsidy’ was devised as an instrument to establish a victory in the post-emergency era elections. This was introduced for the first time in the state of Andhra Pradesh in the 1977 elections. However, contrary to the expectations of the farmers,the subsidies were based on the capacity of the pump, than the measured consumption. Due to this, subsidies in the power sector became routine political weapons all through the 1980s, especially in agriculturally rich states.
To provide for lower tariffs for the agricultural sector,the tariffs on industrial and commercial consumers had to be increased through cross-subsidization. But the differences in tariffs being charged in the industrial and commercial sector vis-a-vis, caused by increasing theft and leakages, poor accountability, loss of revenue, incorrect reporting, and growing losses of the SEBs made them highly dependent on budgetary support from respective governments which aided them in reducing their ability to add generating capacity, and most importantly to carry out the improvement in their asset quality and distribution. Given thedeteriorating financial performance and poor operating performance of SEBs, the onus of setting up new generation capacities fell increasingly on the Union Government. It was in such a situation that to give a fillip to the power sector that amajor policy initiative was taken to amend the ESA, thus initiating the path for the Union government into the sector of power generation.
Thus, Central participation began with the creation of the government to set up two central public sector utilities: National Thermal Power Corporation Limited) for thermal generation (NTPC) and National Hydro Power Corporation Limited (NHPC) for hydropower.
This was done because it was believed that there was a need for an integrated policy for the power sector, and as electricity was a concurrent subject, the advantage of freely framing the laws was an opportunity the Union Government could not miss.
Also, among all other reasons, the need for an integrated policy was that the Union Government observed that there was a clearlack of balance since some states were resource-rich while other states were not. It was also noticed by the government that there were difficulties in connecting the plants of states. For example, one plant in any particular state could provide electricity to two or three neighboring states.
This was followed by several public sector undertaking companies that entered and managed the space of thermal, hydel, and nuclear powers. In this sector, NTPC came to have a special distinction in emerging as one of the largest power-generating utilities in the world in a short period. The economic growth was at a snail’s pace due to less generation capacity. It is an already known fact that for any country to grow, its power generation capacities must always meet the electricity supply. Failure of electricity generation leads to an impact on its industries.
The concept of power grid, which proved to be a pivotal factor for the growth of Indian economy was started when power corporations like that of NTPC and NHPC were created with a mandatory commitment to provide power to various states in the country. However, there was one issue with this. The SEBs could not pay the power generation companies the rate at which the electricity supply was at place.As a result of which, issues like that of energy shortage, weak financial condition of SEBs, and the chain reaction of the agricultural subsidies took away a major part of their revenue for a large period during the 1980s. This was slowly taking a shape of a crisis in one of the important sectors in the country. The Government of India rose to action, and initiated to devise a plan to tackle such issue.
Many economists started advocating for the free market, which was already being pushed for even in developed economies such as the USA and UK. Their contention was simple. That the government ideally had no business to regulate and so any sort of business sense if demand and supply existed for services then the concepts of free markets should be allowed as that would even improve the pricing in the markets.
This type of economic thought was emerging globally and to de-regulate, further regulation was brought in for governments to step back, so that at the very least, the end-user was provided basic protection against corporate malpractices. Furthermore, when we look towards the present-day scenario, we find the governments changing their route from the sectors which could be taken care by the market forces themselves. Coupled with the above mentioned aspect, and the urgent requirement to tend to the fiscal deficit arising due to the crisis of balance of payments, the Government of India in 1990s introduced the reforms in the Indian electricity sector,with the invitation to the Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in the sector as the major highlight.
The initiation of the reforms in the Indian energy sectorwas also due to the ongoing Gulf War at that time which resulted in hike in the fuel prices, and to meet the demand, the government had limited foreign exchange reserves which were almost emptied to meet previous demands. Furthermore, when the country was engulfed in a crisis where the imports were much higher than exports, the nation went to the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to rescue the nation from such crisis.One of the conditions, upon which the World Bank, and the IMF agreed to sanction funds to India was the opening up of the private players in the Indian energy sector. As a result of which, the gates of investment for the private players in the Indian energy sector were opened in the electricity generation sector.
Although the government had opened up the gates for the private players, it still had to take cognizance of the views of the public regarding the private participation in various sectors, which was far from being positive. Hence, the government then opened power generation sector for the private players which made sure that the private players get a chance in the Indian energy sector, and the views of the public also remain neutral.
The reforms in the energy sector also gavepowers to the Government of India to decide the tariff via an amendment to the ESA Act of 1948. Prior to this, the tariff was set as per the discussions between the SEBs and the power generating companies. The government then initiated the process of‘unbundling’ to respond to the growing crisis in the energy sector in the mid-1990s. By this unbundling, the government bifurcated the aspects of SEBs into three parts- generation, transmission, and distribution. One of the major reasons for this bifurcation was to focus on the issues arising in the various aspects in an individual manner, rather than in a collective manner. This would lead to specific problem-oriented mechanisms and minimization of the loss of the utilities.
This shift in the policies, and reforms in the Indian energy sector witnessed an evolution from a model (welfare based), where electricity as a necessity was given free of cost, and the allied subsidies were provided as an instrument to please the public. However, the present-day scenario puts a rather different picture where electricity has evolved as a ‘commodity’ which is packed and sold like other commodities. Thus, the typical model of power developed which is in existence today, that of starting with the generation of electricity, its transmission, and eventually distribution to the consumer.
Initially, when an array of policies which were specifically designed to lure the private investors was introduced, the private players came in numbers to invest in the Indian energy sector. However, with time, these policies to attract the private investors failed to establish a concrete outcome as the disparity between the government and the private investors became unfeasible. As a result of this, an unrest started bubbling amongst the private players, which lead to the government cancelling the licenses of the private players. However, the need of IPPs in the country grew rapidly as the SEBs were in a sick financial position, owing to non-payment of dues by the 1990s.
In 1998, regulatory commissions at the central and the state level called Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) and State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) were established respectively under the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998.
Under this Act, the tariff was to be set by regulatory commissions rather than the government. The government distanced itself from tariff regulation as part of the reform strategy but primarily because it did not want to be seen on the wrong side of the consumers.
The functions of these commissions were to regulate the tariff of generation and transmission utilities and the tariff determination for consumers. The most important contribution of the government to the Indian energy sector would be the enactment of theElectricity Act of 2003.
The year 2003 ushered in a new dawn for the Electricity Sector in India with the enactment of the Electricity Act of 2003, and replacing the legal framework for the energy sector in India which was under the provisions as mentioned under theElectric Supply Act of 1948 and theERC Act of 1998.
The new Electricity Act of 2003 introduced a slew of changes. Under the new act, the power generation was delicensed, and the novel producers were given the permission to construct ‘captive generation plants’ which are the energy plants constructed by a company to serve its own needs within its proximity. The other highlights of the Electricity Act of 2003 include:
1. The Electricity Act of 2003 provided for private transmission licences, and allowed the distribution licensee to take generation and vice versa.
2. The Act further disabled the mandatory power sales that the IPPs had to undertake to the SEBs. This was hailed as one of the moves, which removed the biggest barrier in the way of the IPPs.
3. Companies under the new act have been provided with stricter guidelines to reorganise themselves in such a manner that they appoint directors to supervise the functioning of the company. Hence, a formal approach was put in place by the new Electricity Act of 2003.
4. Under the new act, appropriate Appellate tribunals were created which catered to disposal of appeals against orders of regulatory commission.
Looking towards the growing investments in the Indian energy sector, the Government of India brought in an array of regulatory changes after the enactment of the Electricity Act in 2003 like theamendments to the bill in the years 2005 and 2014, which focused on the needs of the sector from time to time. The amendment to the Act made in the year 2005 was concerned with- electricity safety, and categorizing the offence of theft of electricity, electric lines, and interference with meters as cognizable offences. Furthermore, the amendment also highlighted the requirements for captive generation plants and distribution systems. On the other hand, the amendment made in the year 2014 made it mandatory for the entities to acquire electricity from a market specifically for renewable energy sources.
The Path of Electricity
Earlier, there used to be difficulty in the availability of resources such as coal.
After the reforms (where the focus was more on generation), there was a phenomenal growth in capacity addition that in fact, the government has gone on to state that there is surplus electricity.
While the sector started producing almost 84 GW in 1996-97, it, however, was still falling short of its capacity addition targets. However, since the early 21st century,the installed capacity has grown by almostfour-time which the private sector had an enormous role to play.
With the addition of renewable energy alternatives, there has been a further increase in generation with the segment expected to witness exponential growth over the next few years.
As of the present-day scenario, the major loss in the Indian energy sector could be pinpointed in the energy distribution sector. The aggregate losses have increased ten-fold since 1996-97, from 113 billion to 1.12 trillion rupees in 2014-15. This is because of the agricultural subsidies, pilferage, tampering with meters, electricity theft, inefficient and corrupt administration, etc.
Successive governments have tried to fix the problem through three bailout packages out of which two failed miserably while the third one, theUDAY scheme, is expected to improve the problems in the sector.
The distribution segment remains largely in the hands of the States and is yet to see any concrete efforts since no state has adopted the outright privatization model. Political considerations and the financially insolvent state of the SEBs have proved to be the key impediments in the privatization process.
The changes in the electricity production, transmission, and distribution process have opened the power generation sector to private players and have driven the sector on a high growth trajectory. However, the fault lines in the sector lie elsewhere i.e., in the distribution sector. That while the government in its case of misplaced priorities, has focused primarily on capacity addition rather than improving the distribution segment or improving the last mile connectivity when it comes to electrification.
The government realizes that the key to removing all the inefficiencies in the sector is by improving the distribution aspect, as that is the broken link in the entire journey of electricity, even though the government has gone to claim that this is a surplus, however, till today more of the half of the country does not receive electricity. It is due to these reasons, the government from time-to-time has prioritized the revival of DISCOMs, their commitment to shift towards the renewable energy sources, and rural electrification as their key agendas.
To achieve these objectives, the incumbent government is taking some steps, one of which is the UDAY scheme, where after several failures in revival, the government has initiated this scheme to provide another chance at the revival of the DISCOMs. The scheme is a financial turnaround package for DISCOMs, in which the States are topay 75% of the debt of DISCOMs by selling bonds, while the DISCOMs will pay the remaining 25% by issuing securities. The UDAY scheme highlights the government’s new approach towards the financial restructuring of the DISCOMs. The new approach is based on two pillars- primarily the UDAY scheme is formulated in such a manner where it improves the operational efficiency of the DISCOMs, reduces the cost of power purchase, and enforces a fiscal discipline by aligning itself with the finance of the states. Secondly, it enumerates upon a phase-by-phase takeover of the debts of DISCOMs by the state governments.
Though the UDAY scheme has been applauded, the two key issues of uniformity and consistency amongst the states in India continue to haunt the scheme. The major concern relates to a moral hazard, which involves all such schemes where there is the structuring of debt. Will, there be an incentive to continue doing what they are doing, as eventually there will be a revival package in case the scheme fails
Because till now, massive bailouts have been organized for state-run utilities thinking that they will fall in line, but the losses have kept mounting and this is probably why there has been no fiscal discipline on their part as they keep on anticipating bailout packages from the government at the Union level.
States now are responsible for the actions of the DISCOMs, as future losses will have to be progressively taken on by the state. Hence, it is of utmost importance that for DISCOMs to survive, they have to be cost-efficient and mitigate their losses and eventually revise tariffs. However, governments have always been wary of revising tariffs due to political pressure, thus even today there remains the risk of DISCOMS still failing. That while the UDAY scheme has taken a good start, still, a lot of ground remains to be covered.
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and the Indian Energy Sector
Before the commencement of IBC,there were an array of laws to aid in the winding-up process of the firm. These laws included: The sick Industrial; Companies (Special provisions) Act of 1985, The Provisional Insolvency Act of 1920, the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act of 1909, the Civil Procedure Code of 1909, and the SARFAESI Act of 2002. However, none of these laws were able to address the issues concerning the rapid growth in the NPAs (Non-Performing Assets) of the companies. After many tussles, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was enacted in May 2016.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016 (hereafter referred to as “IBC”) is legislation, whichcombines the features of the provisions as mentioned under the SARFAESI Act of 2002, theRecovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act of 1993,CPC 1908 et cetera. This Act is creditor-friendly, rather than debtor-friendly as the previous acts were. Now IBC is enacted to provide a framework for resolution of insolvency with regards to the corporations, partnerships firms, and individuals promptly which seek the problem of the growing NPAs. With the onset of IBC, the laws in India regarding insolvency have gone through a paradigm shift. It has induced the concept of‘disciplined borrowings’ amongst the companies in India. The IBC has provisions concerning three classes of people who can invoke the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) process. They are- financial creditors, operational creditors, and corporate debtors. The most important highlight of the IBC is the provisions with regards to the prevention of indefinite delay by providing a timeline for the same, as provided under the proviso for Section 12(3) of the IBC via theamendment made to the IBC in the year 2019.
However, the Indian Energy Sector needs special care under the garb of IBC. Before establishing how and why there is a need for a special place in IBC for the Indian energy sector, we must understand the problem at hand. When we speak of power generation in India, it comes from three places- (i) New and Renewable energy, (ii) Hydroelectricity, and (iii) Power generation (which also includes thermal power generation). Now as mentioned under the third point, the power generation sector (specifically the thermal power generation sector) has been facing a lot of issues concerning energy deficit. Thedeficit faced by India stands at 1% from the average of 0.3%. Not just this, the prices of the energy sector have led to asurge of Rs. 20 per unit, which is the highest limit as provided by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission. The blame for this could be shifted to the shortage of coal production in the country.Despite the increased production of coal at the domestic level– Coal India Ltd. has increased by 23%, the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd.’s coal production increased by 34.2%, and 40% by captive mines, the coal-based thermal power plants failed to meet the demand of electricity. The reasons could be associated with the under-preparation of the utilities, the unforeseen heatwave in the country, and the recent Russia-Ukraine crisis. As a result of all of this, the government has invoked Section11 (1) of the Electricity Act of 2003, which is read as:
“Appropriate Government may specify that a generating company shall, in extraordinary circumstances, operate and maintain any generating station under the directions of that Government.”
Explanation. – For this section, the expression “extraordinary circumstances” means circumstances arising out of threat to security of the State, public order or a natural calamity or such other circumstances arising in the public interest.
Not just this, the Indian energy sector faces several issues due to billing arrangements, coal linkage, and environmental clearance. This in turn affects the Indian energy sector and leads to the dissolution of energy plants as they also seek funding (which is extremely essential), and the lenders invoke the IBC.
Having understood the issues at hand, we would now understand why is it necessary to have a separate part for the Indian Energy Sector under the IBC:
1. Now whenever IBC is invoked by the three mentioned classes of people for CIRP, the intention is always to pay off the creditors, and the management is changed so that the corporation is rejuvenated, and the old set of management is nowhere around the corporation, as they were the reason for the fall of the corporation.However, with DISCOMs, the issue is rather turbulent. There exists the issue of non-payment of the DISCOMs, non-receipt from the third party, et cetera. Now it used to take years, and years to file the appeals, and then pursue the proceedings. However, the Ministry of Power in December 2021 provided that theinsolvency proceedings could be initiated against the DISCOMs as they are a ‘government company’ under section 2(45) of the Companies Act of 2013, and comes under the ambit of IBC under section 3(7). This was highlighted in the case ofTamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited (TANGEDCO) v. Union Of India (2021). As mentioned above, even though such measures have taken place, it takes a rather long time to decide upon the matter, which makes the corporation endure further financial distress. This aspect also defeats one of the main features of the IBC, which enumerates upon the time bar with regards to prevention of indefinite delay as provided under section 12(3) of the IBC. Another aspect of the same could be the nature of electricity as a commodity. Electricity is termed as a‘standard product’. Dwelling on the specifics, the nature of electricity is such that it has to be consumed immediately. One of the major points of differentiation between other commodities and electricity is its ability to be stored. Now coming back to the CIRP process as mentioned above. As per IBC, upon the admission of the notice with regards to the insinuation of the insolvency proceedings under section 7, the interim resolution professional arrives within 14 days of such admission. Now, looking at the fundamental nature of electricity, the consumption cannot be halted just because the power company is undergoing insolvency proceedings. This rather creates an issue.
2. Theover-regulation of the power sector or the state monopoly over the DISCOMs is creating further issues concerning the regulations being imposed. That includes- the compensation claims, the tariffs applied, allocation of inputs required for generation, et cetera are some of the aspects which are regulated by the regulatory commissions. Even after the introduction of the‘open access power market’ the disparities continue. The open-access power market is usually discouraged as it takes away the majority of the players from the commercial and industrial sectors. The open-access power sector, which is based on the notion of running parallel to sell energy to those from the open energy market, rather than the expensive grids is now plagued with restrictions, and constraints in the form of an increase in open access charges, denial of open access approvals, and rigid energy banking norms. This establishment of state monopoly runs contrary to applying a commercial framework provided under IBC.
3. The aspect of SPVs under the IBC and the Indian energy sector. Now, Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) or Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) refer to those subsidiary companies, which are created by the parent company to insulate itself from any financial risk associated, if the parent company undertakes a risky project. These SPVs are kept off the balance sheets, owing to their separate legal status. The rise of SPEs in India, specifically in the energy sector might create concern regarding its status. However, do not forget that the precedents are in order already. Some of the examples of such precedents could be:
3.1The State Bank of India very recently has moved to the NCLT with regards to recovery of debts against Essel Infraprojects, amounting to Rs. 100 crores. This case involves two SPVs, where one of them is Coruscation Vidyut Vitaran (Ujjain) which was formerly known as Essel Vidyut Vitaran. This SPV faces proceedings under the SARFAESI Act as Essel Infraprojects was the guarantor for these SPVs.
3.2 The nature of SPVs was defined under the landmark case ofTamil Nadu Powers Association v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission (2020). The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL), while analyzing the Electricity Rules of 2005 concerningthe captive status of a Captive Generation Plant (CGP) held that SPVs cannot be brought into the same spectrum as that of AOPs (Association of Persons) as provided under Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules of 2005.
Conclusion
When we enumerate the aspect of IBC and the Indian energy sector, there needs to be work done concerning providing separate legislation for the same. The prime reason is the application of a purely commercial-based framework to the Indian Energy Sector, which is either under the state monopoly, or has high constraints concerning regulations even in the open-access power markets.
Now, it is to be noted that a common trend amongst resolution professionals is that there is no need for separate legislation for the same. The reason for the same is because of the introduction of private players to the resolution process as provided under the IBC.If the private players are introduced, and they ensure financial restructuring of the same, then the state governments would be free from the shackles of providing aid to the DISCOMs in the form of grants, funds, et cetera. But again, this is not completely viable as DISCOMs are those state-owned corporations that produce ‘electricity’ as their commodity. There are strong concerns with regards to the disruption of the electricity services when the insolvency process is ongoing, the role of NCLT and the state regulatory commission to name a few.
There is another possibility of providing analternative to the said legislation. Legislations like that of SARFESAI of 2002 would ensure that the entire company is not turned to dust, and revival of the said corporation is possible. Furthermore, even if separate legislation is put in place, then there needs to be a proper provision, which addressed the issues relating to the challenges faced by the stakeholders in the power sector for that matter.
About the Authors
Adv. Meghna Rao is an Advocate and Founder of “Rao Legal”.
Abeer Tiwari is a 3rd-year B.A. LL.B student from Balaji Law College, Pune, and is an Associate Editor at IJPIEL.
Editorial Team
Managing Editor: Naman Anand
Editors-in-Chief: Jhalak Srivastav and Muskaan Singh
Senior Editor: Aribba Siddique
Associate Editor: Abeer Tiwari
Junior Editor: Vedant Bisht
Preferred Method of Citation
Meghna Rao and Abeer Tiwari, “India, Indian Energy Sector, and IBC: An Assay” (IJPIEL, 16 July 2022)
<https://ijpiel.com/index.php/2022/07/16/india-indian-energy-sector-and-ibc-an-assay/>
Quite informative .
I have a query in regard to determination of tariff of a renewable plant which has been acquired through IBC route.
The State Commission had determined tariff of this generator in 2013 for five years as per notified regulations , wherein the capital cost was considered as per book value of the assets. (Life of the plant is 20 years). Now in the year 2020 , this plant has gone into liquidation and subsequently this plant has been acquired by a new owner.
Initially, when for the first time tariff was determined , the capital cost was considered as Rs 32 Cr. However , the new owner has acquired this plant at Rs 17 Cr.
So , please guide me , whether , in view of IBC rule, the new capital cost should be cost 17 Cr for determination of tariff for the remaining period, or its historical cost of 32 Cr after accounting for depreciation and debt repayment.
Thanks
Very informative ,worth reading and got to know lot after reading .I wish the best to the writers and team .