Since the late 1950s, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have outperformed all other legal instruments in the field of international investment law. These agreements give investors the most comprehensive legal protection for their property rights. They do so by enumerating criteria in other countries, such as substantive investment rights. While they are mentioned as a source of law in the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Process, it has long been observed that the international human rights duties of investment-receiving governments (“host-states”) receive little or no attention in this process. This is due to the asymmetric nature of the BITs’ provisions, as well as the arbitral tribunals’ inability to develop the human rights component of the business.

Arbitral tribunals have erroneously interpreted host-states as violating the BITs provisions, even in legitimate cases where states have a police power to protect public health, the environment, and other human rights implications such as labour standards, due to the astasia and imbalanced discourse between international investment law and international human rights law. The pro-investor stance contends that BITs should be considered as a “self-contained system” of international law that works independently of international human rights law as the basis of international investment law. Human rights lawyers, on the other hand, argue for a broader definition of the host state’s regulatory jurisdiction, allowing them to interfere in the investment dispute resolution process to safeguard human rights. This essay looks at how these two concerns might be harmonized to achieve widespread integration and tenable cross-fertilization of international human rights and foreign investment protection legislation. 

I. Introduction 

Over the last 50 years, international law has evolved significantly. There have been two major competing, at times pragmatically conflicting, regimes of international law that will continue to substantively define the general practices and behaviour of states in the discourse of international law and policy, The first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959.[i] This signified a dramatic shift in international investment protection by becoming a key tool and source of international investment law. BIT emerges as a major legal instrument in the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The BIT is an international agreement protecting the investments of foreign investors from non-commercial risks such as nationalization and other regulatory measures interfering with the legitimate expectations of the investors.[ii]

International treaties have become the main source of rules in the foreign investment sector as a result of debates between the global north and the global south about how to protect foreign investment. International standards and principles that defend people’s rights and freedoms in other nations appear to be unimportant to this new BIT notion, at least when it comes to protecting foreign investors. Private interests are the most essential factor to consider while negotiating bilateral treaties and associated procedural safeguards.[iii]

When it comes to investment protection and stimulation, there are only a few key elements in BITs. Only foreign investors have two main rights in BITs these days: substantive rights in terms of how foreign investment is treated and how disputes areresolved. Surprisingly, when it comes to investors in the country where the treaty is signed, most investment treaties don’t include much concerning the rights of non-investors. This usually means that foreign investors are not required to take any action.[iv]

International human rights law is another branch of public international law that has a lot of well-known rulings and discussions. This evolved after World War II when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was signed in 1948. It is not enough for a government to just protect its citizens’ rights. In some situations, a country’s regulation of non-state entities, such as corporations, is also necessary to ensure that all citizens have access to the rights guaranteed by all international human rights accords. If the host state has signed bilateral investment treaties with foreign investors, foreign investors may challenge their treatment at the hands of the host state despite the host state’s motive to advert its human rights obligations to protect, respect, and fulfil-springing. as per the UN treaty rights. These two items don’t go along well. To put it another way, the true issue arises when the host state’s efforts to enforce human rights duties based on other international human rights treaties and protocols collide with the international investment instrument’s monothematic economic purpose.

Human rights problems, such as how human rights law might be utilized to resolve conflicts between foreign investors and states, are frequently raised before international arbitration tribunals. As a result, it’s not unexpected that investment arbitration tribunals have a difficult time balancing the protection of foreign investment with the host country’s international human rights commitments.

The concept behind international investment law and investor-state arbitration is that host governments should not be able to rely on international human rights commitments as a defence. This is what people say. In practice, however, each conflict settlement has its own constitution, and thus, there is always the potential for inconsistent rulings and fragmentation.  In the long run, human rights values and protecting foreign investors do not appear to be compatible.[v]

Two different approaches to this problem are the general law method and the investment treaty arbitration approach. As a result, some people regard investment treaties as a “self-contained regime” of international law, different from the principles of general public international law. One of the most crucial things to understand about the seeming conflict between international investment protection and international human rights enforcement mechanisms is this.

In terms of how they are thought of, this essay seeks to figure out how BITs and international human rights duties of the nations where they are set up operate together. In a court case, host states may be able to invoke international human rights duties owed to them under human rights treaties (such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

To defend human dignity and the “global good”, the world requires the rule of law. This means that no single international legal regime can be examined in isolation. When resolving an investment dispute, arbitral venues should allow both the business and human rights interests of a foreign investor and the host state to be considered.

The essay begins by attempting to cover two topics: BITs and investment protection. It further talks about a conservative interpretation of investment protection as “a self-contained system”, and investigates if this is true in the conversation. An essential portion of the essay also looks into socialist notions and the significant reliance on the “police force” of host countries. It also discusses the current condition of investor-state investment dispute resolution, examining a few cases that demonstrate how human rights might be compromised. Finally, the author discusses policy options for overcoming the practical tension between the legal framework for foreign investment protection and the human rights discourse. The conclusion is the final section of the essay.

II. Evolution, Definition, and Major Contents of BITs 

BITs became the most important legal tools for regulating private foreign investment in the United States after the first half of the twentieth century. BITs are international treaties that provide the rules and conditions for citizens and corporations of one country to invest in another.[vi] There are BITs, according to Cornell University’s Legal Information Institute.[vii] The Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties were the first treaties to be signed “FCNs compel the host country to treat foreign investments in the same way that investments from other countries are treated. In certain circumstances, the host government handled domestic investors the same way it treated foreign investors. They also establish commerce and shipping restrictions, as well as foreigners’ rights to conduct business and own property in the host country.[viii]

The second generation of these treaties is known as BITs, and it lays out regulations for governments to follow when dealing with foreign investors. Fair and equitable treatment, expropriation protection, free movement of goods, safety, and security for foreign investors are among the rules. A Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) is an agreement between two states that protects and stimulates investments from one state to the other,[ix] ensuring that investors from one country are treated fairly when they invest in the other. BIT grants foreign investors rights against sovereign governments, allowing them to initiate arbitration proceedings against a country if it fails to follow a treaty’s terms. Investors have sought millions of dollars in damages under BITs for state regulations such as coping with a financial emergency, refusing to give a toxic waste site license, and implementing affirmative action legislation.[x]

Most BITs feature a clause that discusses how to handle disagreements. When an investor files an arbitration case under the treaty, the state makes a unilateral offer to settle issues through arbitration, which the investor accepts. BITs are agreements between a host country and the home country of an investor. If a host government fails to keep its promises to a foreign investor as outlined in the BIT, the foreign investor may file a claim against the host country in an international arbitration tribunal. The arbitration is not between the two countries that signed the BIT in this case. Instead, the investor can sue the country that violated the treaty’s guarantees to the company’s private owner. It’s worth noting that, so far, the majority of cases have been initiated by investors.[xi]

These agreements are unique in that they permit an international arbitration process in which an investor who believes their rights under the BIT have been violated can seek assistance from an international arbitration body such as the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID” or “the Centre”). The ICSID is the world’s most significant arbitration group for investor-state disputes. More than 100 countries signed the ICSID, sometimes known as the Washington Convention, which came into law in 1966 in order to assist in the resolution and arbitration of international investment disputes and help governments and their citizens resolve investment conflicts. It is an independent international body which is not governed by any single government, established to resolve legal disputes between parties who are eligible.

There were more than 2,600 types of suchagreements until the beginning of 2008. The majority of these BITs are still between developed and developing countries. BITs defend and secure foreign investment as the primary source of international investment law. They contain several essential clauses, the most important of which protect foreign investors from unlawful expropriation or nationalization, as well as unfair and discriminatory treatment and limits on money transfers. Preambles, definitions of investment and investors, treatment of investment, expropriation, currency transfer, subrogation, and dispute resolution clauses are all identical in most BITs, as are the definitions of investment and investors.

III. Can a State Raise International Human Rights Obligation in a ‘BIT’ Dispute Settlement Process? 

The fundamental purpose of the investment treaty is to stimulate FDI by providing the best legal protection for both the investment and the investors. This is why the discussion on the history and general contents of BITs is relevant. Foreign investors’ private interests aren’t the only source of worry in international investment activity. People’s human rights in the host country should be just as important as foreign investors’ private interests. Because this is the only option to resolve the conflict, international human rights norms should be incorporated into the exit process of international investment dispute settlement. It’s important to remember that investment protection is important, but it doesn’t have to jeopardize host nations’ international human rights obligations in the same way that it does now. The argument is that these two domains of international law are not distinct and cannot effectively collaborate.[xii] There are many distinctions between investment law and human rights when it comes to international law, yet they both strive to make the world work by the rules of the law.

Today, the majority of international investment accords follow a fairly conventional format. They generally provide unique international law rights and remedies to foreign investors to protect their assets. Individual foreign investors can file international arbitrations against the host country for alleged violations of international investment treaties through investor-state arbitration. “Investor-state arbitration” is the term for these types of arbitrations.

Human rights lawyers are concerned that “arbitrators set up to settle disputes under these bilateral investment treaties are trusted to protect the interests of investors over the interests of the public.”[xiii] In the case of Toto v. Lebanon, an investment arbitration panel decided that “investment” was simply a term for profit-motivated economic activities.[xiv] In light of these new developments, it is frightening to consider the practical tension between protecting investors’ private interests and protecting the public interests of the host states’ citizens, which could result in a long-term structural conflict between countries that send and receive investments. When a host government wishes to apply its international human rights commitments to preserve environmental rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, public health, and so on, investors and host countries struggle. How much importance should be given to the host state’s human rights when resolving an investor-state dispute? This is because the host country has a different international obligation to fulfill, such as the human rights obligation.

Many international human rights attorneys believe that it is a good thing that nations can properly mention their human rights commitments in their arguments before investment arbitration courts.[xv] There are two crucial points to discuss after this thesis. To begin with, the BIT is not an international law system in which arbitrators must solely apply the requirements of the bilateral agreement and disregard other international human rights standards. International law is best understood as a system of interconnected laws that apply to a variety of situations. When there is a theoretical or practical disagreement in the process of settling an investment dispute, the host state may be able to demonstrate that it is abiding by international human rights. Secondly, “police power” is supposed to enable the host country to do everything necessary to regulate the investment, including complying with its international human rights commitments. The following paragraphs examine these two reasons, weaving and crossing key international investment dispute cases into the discussion to gain a better grasp of the situation.

A. Is BIT a “Self-Contained Regime” of International Law?

Only one group of persons believes that international human rights laws should not be applied in the resolution of investment disputes. Their reasoning is based on the premise that the BIT is a self-governing and independent system that is not bound by any other domain of international law. Scholars have debated whether international investment law is a separate and distinct international legal regime due to its focus on a specific function. This means that arbitral courts disagree on the manner of handling certain non-investment duties.[xvi]

The idea of self-contained regimes was first used in the Permanent Court of International Justice’s S.S. Wimbledon case and was expanded on by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its decision on the Tehran Hostages. According to the International Law Commission (ILC), groups of rules and principles dealing with a single subject may form a “special regime” and can be used as lex specialis. People in these kinds of unique settings frequently form their own groups to enforce regulations.[xvii] Some commentators have attempted to think of BITs as a separate part of international law that is “self-contained,” but others, such as Professor S. Wiessner, are concerned that this could have negative consequences since it won’t help in accommodating different public interests (human rights, environment, public health, cultural concerns, and so on).

As a result, Professor Wiessner stated that he “strongly agreed” with his words, adding that “it is not possible for [a general international law] system to be made up of entirely autonomous subsystems.” It only makes sense that international investment treaties cannot be drafted and used without taking international human rights law into account because different rules of international law are linked together. Claim: It may be impossible to expect the BIT to function as a self-contained, self-governing international law system. It’s also unlikely that BIT will resolve the social challenges that develop when international investors and host countries collaborate on economic and investment issues.

B. Is the Regulatory Power/Police Power of the Host-States Legitimate?

Since most countries have BITs, investors have claimed that the government can only acquire their capital if it is for a non-discriminatory public purpose and provided that they are reimbursed.[xviii] The issue is of determining whether valid lines of intersection exist between investment protection and host state power. Expropriations aren’t the only government measures that take away property. We need to look at the sectors that the host state has the legal authority to regulate. If there are regulatory difficulties that can be placed in the international human rights domain, it may be easier for the host state to invoke its international human rights obligation as a force majeure in the investor-state dispute settlement process. Let’s take a look at how vital the concept of “police authority” is to grasp how this works.

The concept of “police power” has been around for a long time and is based on centuries of customary international law. This theory is heavily influenced by the concept of regulatory power. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “the notion of police power asserts that governments have the authority to enact regulations and laws for the benefit of their citizens. In law, police power refers to a government’s ability to lift limits on people’s personal freedoms and property rights to preserve people’s health and morality, as well as to increase public convenience and prosperity. It is a crucial aspect of government.”[xix] It is the authority that states and countries exercise in order to keep their people safe, healthy, happy, and moral. A government’s fundamental right to make all the laws it needs is unalienable.

International law courts have complimented the practice of “police power” regulation on several occasions when there is a deprivation in favour of public order and morality, protection of the environment and human health, and state taxation are the regulations that might justify non-compensation.[xx] When it comes to international investment conflicts, the term “police powers” is used in a variety of ways. Some people believe that “police powers” are merely one component to consider, while others believe they are the sole factor to consider. The government can use police authorities to defend vital public interests from certain forms of harm. Let’s take an example to understand this: a state may prohibit the use of an insecticide that has been proven to cause cancer even in small doses. Had this insecticide been an investor’s only investment, they could’ve lose everything and never gotten their money back. However, the government must still enact legislation to defend and guarantee the right to adequate health for its inhabitants.

As part of their international human rights obligations, states must defend, promote, and implement human rights. Most of the time, this means the state must adopt legislative and enforcement efforts to incorporate international human rights commitments into its own laws and policies. This is a direct reference to host states’ police power to ensure that the public’s health is protected. Countries no longer have as much authority as they used to when they signed bilateral investment agreements. This is a theoretical as well as a practical issue. This limit could also be spread out over time so that the state’s responsibility to defend and promote human rights isn’t always as strong as it should be.

Investment rules, in the view of international law and practice, can’t work on their own, without the general public’s perception of human rights in the host country. This is why, during the investment dispute settlement process, the host country should be entitled to speak out about its international human rights duties. It is, for example, possible that a state might being forced to regulate the operations of a foreign company to prevent its investment from exacerbating the state’s drinking water scarcity (particularly because drinking water is a limited natural resource and a fundamental condition for survival). One of the most important international human rights agreements, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“the Covenant”), states, under Paragraphs 11 (1) and 12., that state parties have urgent obligations concerning the right to water. According to General Comment No. 15 (2002) of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, these actions must be planned, concrete, and geared toward the full realisation of the right to water. The 63 States that have signed the Covenant have a responsibility to work expeditiously and effectively to realise the right to water in its entirety.

Given the foregoing scenario, one could argue that the host state’s legal regulatory measures are also a positive obligation that governments have to ensure that citizens’ socio-economic rights are respected. The level of regulatory action that a host state engages in for foreign investment, on the other hand, should be determined by the risk that the investor poses to the host country’s resources.

C. Survey of Practical Challenges: the ICSID

The International Center for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) is an autonomous international institution. Jurisdiction of the Center, according to article 25 ARTICLE 25 (1) of its establishment Convention, “extends to Any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Center by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute agree to submit to the Center in writing, falls under the jurisdiction of the Center. It is believed to be the ideal location to go if you are involved in a BIT arbitration with a country and a foreign investor.

Established by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the ICSID can assist with international investment disputes by acting as an unbiased international forum. Its rules and procedures can be used by an independent arbitration panel to resolve disputes. However, it does not arbitrate disputes. The number of BITs has exploded in the previous two decades; ICSID is hereby becoming increasingly popular. In the process of resolving disputes, the main source of substantive law for resolving disputes is the BITs, while the ICSID Convention is employed as a source of procedural law. BITs allow visitors to sue the country they are visiting, referred to as an “international right of standing”. The best way to resolve disputes between investors and governments is through ICSID arbitration.

According to UNCTAD data, non-rich nations were the target of over two-thirds of the 219 known investment treaty claims. Many developing-world countries have been sued by investors, and many of them have been sued by multiple countries. People in the developing world are increasingly criticizing ICSID, believing that the organization always sides with international investors when they have a problem with them. The question is whether a private investor’s interests are more significant than the State’s. People from other nations will always strive to protect their investments, and governments will frequently take regulatory action to protect the public. These interests frequently clash when the government regulates public services such as water, power, trash disposal, and sanitation. This isn’t the first time something like this has occurred. Private investment arbitration and the ICSID system, in general, present a slew of challenging considerations, concerning how successfully the system can assist poor nations in growing their economy sustainably and equitably. The range of matters covered by the over 300 arbitrations known to have been started includes all types of regulatory measures, including environmental, human health, taxation, urban planning, and many more.[xxi]

In investor-state arbitrations, how are international human rights legislations to be applied? This is an important topic to ask because there are so many unknowns. Investor-state arbitrations always begin with the investor alleging that the state has infringed its rights under the BIT. The question of whether a state has infringed on an investor’s rights will be decided last. Even while existing case law suggests that human rights do not play a large part in how the judge rules, international human rights law problems might be raised during legal arguments.[xxii]

Oneissue is that these tribunals lack clear and uniform norms that allow them to or assist them in determining whether or not a country must take action to comply with its own international human rights duties. The arbitrators who determine BIT issues may also jeopardize human rights. The parties usually choose the arbitrators in investor-state arbitration tribunals, as set out in the Washington Convention. One arbitrator is chosen by each party, while the third arbitrator is chosen by the two arbitrators appointed by each party. There are, however, two issues with arbitrators.  Firstly, the arbitrator may be unfamiliar with human rights principles; hence, certain constraints need to be placed on who can serve as an arbitrator. Arbitrators, according to the International Chamber of Commerce, must have a “recognised competence” in business or finance.[xxiii] Thus, most BIT arbitrators come from a business background and have little knowledge of human rights laws. People who work for a tribunal may be unfamiliar with how to deal with a human right issues. Secondly, many human rights specialists would be unable to act as arbitrators in BIT arbitration due to their lack of knowledge of international investment law.

As a result, international investment arbitrators’ activities should ensure that firms and investors wish for them to serve as arbitrators in the future. This is because international investment arbitrators form a small and close-knit community, and to acquire a job in such a small space, arbitrators must demonstrate “commercial honesty and adherence to the values of global business.” This will have a significant impact on the promotion of international human rights principles in bilateral investment dispute resolution.

IV. Conclusion and Alternatives for Policy Consideration 

The conflict is that the BIT, which is the primary source of international investment law, is a self-governing and independent regime of international law that excludes other principles of international law, such as international human rights rules. The lopsided construction of these treaties is because foreign investors receive substantive rights without having to contribute anything in exchange. It provides valuable rights to investors without requiring them to perform anything in return. Since treaties do not define rights in the same manner for everyone, international human rights are unlikely to be considered when the investment issue is resolved as it is currently. Human rights norms have played a large part in how investment disputes have been resolved for as long as there have been investment disputes.

If one wishes to increase human rights protection in the sector of bilateral investment, it would require the amendment of the current nature of BITs to include specific human rights protections. Most crucially, particular international human rights accords may be included in a BIT, which would be a wise move. If the treaty includes a language for investor-state dispute settlement, it should also specify how human rights responsibilities might be enforced in front of an arbitrator. If there are any future BITs, they must include what each party must do to protect and promote human rights.

Capital-exporting countries should implement a new generation of BITs to hold businesses accountable for human rights crimes. This is how they should respond to concerns regarding international human rights abuses. There should be a “due diligence” norm and a “clean hand” regulation for investors to follow. These rules can assist investors in being legally responsible for human rights violations. States should further alter BITs to remove or minimise barriers to a host country’s regulatory ability to defend human rights, and they should change the normative framework of BITs to reflect a broader and more sustainable development policy and to make them less restrictive.  International human rights norms and rules have arguably achieved the status of jus cogens, much more than the rules and norms of international investment, and therefore, can conclusively generate an obligation erga omnes towards any actor of international law.

In terms of how arbitral tribunals operate, the balancing role played by them between private and public interests should be based more on general international law rules since there is a willingness to allow cross-fertilization of precedents and practices from various international human rights forums when interpreting different types of rights. If the purpose of international investment were solely to push human rights rules out of the commercial realm, humanity and dignity would be jeopardised. International development would become insecure and unsustainable as a result of this.


[1] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and Geneva, Sept. 17, 2009, World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, 32; Luke Eric Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties, Rights & Democracy, 12 (2009).

[2] Rudolph Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 3- 7.

[3] D.F. Vagts, W.S. Dodge, and H.H. Koh, Transnational Business Problems (2003) 455.

[4] Luke Eric Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties, Rights & Democracy, (2009) 12, 15.

[5] Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (2009) 280-85.

[6] Rudolph Dolzer & Margrete stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995) 1-3.

[7] Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 5th ed. 2003) 88.

[8] Todd Grierson-Weiler & Ian A. Laird, Standards of Treatment, in the Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 259, 275-85 (Peter Muchlinski et al. Eds., 1st ed. 2008).

[9] Luke emc Peterson, The Global Governance of Foreign Direct Investment: Madly Off in All Directions 3 (2005).

[10] Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties attract FDI? Only a bit … And they could Bite

(2003) 22-23.

[11] Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigen, Transnational Corporate Responsibility for the 21st Century: Corporate Responsibility Before International Institutions, 40. INT’L L. Revd. 1025, 1054 (2009).

[12] Surya P. Subedi, The Challenge of Reconciling the Competing Principles within the Law of Foreign Investment with Special Reference to the Recent Trend in the Interpretation of the Term “Expropriation”, 40 Int’l Laws. 121, 123 (2006)

[13] Sigrief Wiessner, The New Haven School of Jurisprudence: A Universal Toolkit for Understanding and Shaping the Law, 18 Asia pacific law Review 45, 57-58 (2010).

[14] Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A v. Republic of Lebanon, [2009] ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12.

[15] James Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of International Law’s Unity, 18 Decrial 77, 129 (2007).

[16] Oxford International Economic Law, Unification Rather Than Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of International Investment Law and Human Rights Law, in Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration 15 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmanm, and Franchesco Francioni eds., 2009).

[17] The ILC Consolidated Report, 2006.

[18] Andrew Necombe & Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties 325-26 (2009).

[19] BLACK’S LAW Dictionary 1156 (6th ed. 1990). This definition draws on US law in the area, but is consistent with international law; see also George Aldrich, What Constitutes A Compensahle Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunals, 88 AJIL 585, 605 (1994).

[20] NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 52, at 358.

[21] United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review, U.N. Doc. No. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4 (2006); Luke Eric Peterson, Investment Treaty News 2006: Year in Review (2006), at 3-6

[22] Peter Muchlinski, Caveat Investor The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 527 (2006).

[23] Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights, infer research paper series human rights, corporate responsibility and sustainable development (2010), at 25.


About the Author

Mr. Vikas Khokhar is a practicing advocate with specialization in energy/infrastructure laws and international dispute resolution. He did his Master’s in International Energy Law dispute resolution and avoidance, from University of Dundee (CEPMLP) UK.

Editorial Team 

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Preferred Method of Citation  

Vikas Khokhar, “BITs and International Human Rights Norms: Is Humanity a ‘Collateral Damage’?” (IJPIEL, 9 November 2022) 


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